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THE MONTREAL CONVENTION-THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT EMBRACES AIRLINES' PRACTICE OF
"BUMPING" TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' RECOVERY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY UNDER ARTICLE 17
LINDSEY RAY ALTMEYER*
INTRODUCTION
A NYONE WHO HAS TAKEN a commercial flight is likely fa-
lm iliar with the plight of the international air traveler: De-
lays, lost luggage, and distracting seatmates are as frequent as,
and arguably more expected than, passengers arriving to their
destination on time and incident free. In addition to technical
and weather delays, travelers must also concern themselves with
the possibility of being involuntarily bumped from their sched-
uled flight. "Bumping" is the industry-wide airline practice of
intentionally overselling tickets on a flight to compensate for
cancellations and exchanges.' In the event all paid passengers
arrive for the flight, select customers are forced to give up their
seats and reschedule on a later flight. 2 Recently, in Campbell v.
Air Jamaica Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided
whether a passenger's personal injuries that resulted from being
bumped from an international flight supported a cognizable
claim under Articles 17 or 19 of the Montreal Convention.3 The
court held that economic damages suffered by the plaintiff due
to the delay were recoverable under Article 19; however, recov-
ery was denied under Article 17 as bumping was common prac-
tice and therefore did not qualify as an "accident," which is
necessary to state a claim for personal injury.4
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2016; B.B.A., Finance, Texas
A&M University, 2006. The author would like to thank her family, friends, and
husband, Luke, for their constant motivation, love, and support.
Campbell v. AirJam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Weiss
v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
2 Id.
3 See id. at 1165.
4 Id. at 1171-72.
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I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff Allan Campbell purchased a ticket for an Air Jamaica
Limited flight from Kingston, Jamaica to Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida, scheduled for September 8, 2009.' Campbell arrived at the
airport three hours prior to the scheduled take-off time,
checked-in, received a boarding pass, cleared security, and be-
gan to board the plane after a four hour delay.6 Before taking
his seat, Campbell was called back to the boarding gate where
he was informed that he would not be accommodated on his
reserved flight and must make other arrangements to fly out the
next day.7 An agent at the check-in counter required Campbell
to pay a $150 change fee to secure a reservation on the next
day's Air Jamaica flight and refused to assist him with hotel ar-
rangements for the night.8 Airport construction forced Camp-
bell to spend the night outside, exposed to inclement weather. 9
Campbell claimed he began feeling ill from the delay at the air-
port.10 His condition was then exacerbated by the poor treat-
ment from the airline personnel and difficult sleeping
arrangements.11 Upon arrival in Fort Lauderdale, he sought
medical attention. 12 He later collapsed at his home in Miami
and was hospitalized for treatment of a heart attack.
13
In a pro se complaint, Campbell alleged that the airline agent
was negligent in "'bumping [Campbell] from the flight and
abandoning' him" and that the "delay and abandonment were
the sole cause of his heart attack."14 He sued Air Jamaica under
Articles 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention for damages and
injury resulting from the delay and being bumped from the
flight, claiming the airline's negligent bumping constituted an
"accident" for purposes of Article 17.15 The district court
granted Air Jamaica's motion to dismiss finding that Campbell's
claims for pure emotional distress and anxiety were not recover-
able under Article 19 and "neither flight delay nor bumping









14 Id. at 1168.
15 Id. at 1167-68.
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constitute[d] a requisite 'accident"' under Article 17.16 Camp-
bell appealed the district court's blanket dismissal. 17 The Elev-
enth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's
judgment as to the delay claim: Campbell sought recovery for
the $150 change fee, which was sufficient to constitute eco-
nomic damages under Article 19.18 However, the court affirmed
the district court's ruling that Campbell did not state a claim
under Article 17.1' The Eleventh Circuit agreed that bumping is
not an "accident," nor did the events occur during embarkation
or disembarkation as required by Article 17.20
II. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
The Montreal Convention, an international treaty related to
aviation, governs damages arising from international air travel.21
The Montreal Convention replaced the Warsaw Convention and
preempts all state and federal claims that fall within its scope.22
Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, titled "Delay," provides
that an air carrier is liable for damage resulting from the delay
of passengers, cargo, or baggage.23 Courts have widely held that
recovery under Article 19 is limited to economic damages and
does not provide a cause of action for physical injury or emo-
tional harm.24
Additionally, Article 17 states: "The carrier is liable for dam-
age sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger
upon condition only that the accident which caused the death
16 Id. at 1168.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1171.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1173.
21 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
22 The Montreal Convention encompasses much of the previous Warsaw Con-
vention and many courts apply Warsaw jurisprudence to Montreal cases. See Para-
dis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y 2004);
Christopher E. Cotter, Recent Caselaw Addressing Three Contentious Issues in the Mon-
treal Convention, 24 No. 4 AIR & SPACE LAw. 9 (2012).
23 Montreal Convention, supra note 21, art. 19.
24 See Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1170 ("The parties agree that Article 19 permits the
payment of economic damages but does not contemplate compensation for emo-
tional loss or physical injury."). See also Vumbaca v. Terminal One Grp., 859 F.
Supp. 2d 343, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Courts in the Second Circuit have found
that Article 19 only applies to economic loss occasioned by delay in transportation."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking. '' 25 Therefore,
as articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, Article 17 requires three
elements: (1) an accident; (2) death or bodily injury; and (3)
occurrence on board the aircraft or during any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. 6 Although much can be
said about delay under Article 19 and what constitutes the oper-
ations of embarking or disembarking under Article 17, this arti-
cle will focus on the court's analysis of "accident."
A. COURT INTERPRETATION OF "ACCIDENT"
In Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court defined accident as
"an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger" and instructed that "the definition should be
flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances. '27 Fur-
thermore, "when the injury indisputably results from the passen-
ger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal and expected
operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an acci-
dent. ' 28 The focus of many courts has been whether the event
causing the injury is a routine or customary practice of air
travel. 29 Given the range of possibilities of unexpected or unu-
sual events in air travel-and the extent that those events have
become customary practice-it comes as no surprise that plain-
tiffs have little direction from case law as to what does or does
not satisfy the definition of an "accident."
Courts have readily found that actions or inactions related to
international flights do not establish an Article 17 accident. For
example, the Supreme Court held that a passenger who lost
hearing in one ear due to the normal pressurization of the air-
plane cabin had not been exposed to an accident.30 The Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no accident occurred by
a flight crew's failure to make an emergency landing when a
passenger was showing early signs of a heart attack. 31 The South-
ern District Court of New York determined that a woman's slip-
25 Montreal Convention, supra note 21, art. 17.
26 Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1172.
27 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
28 Id. at 406.
29 Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1172 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 404-05); see also Cotter,
supra note 22, at 11.
10 Saks, 470 U.S. at 395-96.
31 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
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and-fall on a discarded plastic blanket bag while in-flight was not
an accident.3 2
On the other hand, courts often find that events that are not
routine or customary may be considered accidents. The Su-
preme Court affirmed that a flight attendant's refusal to move
an asthmatic gentleman away from the smoking section of the
airplane, resulting in his death, was an accident.3 3 A California
District Court found that a passenger's movement in the seat
and subsequent jostling of the seatback tray, which caused a cup
of hot tea to slide off the tray and injure the plaintiff, was an
accident.34 A Massachusetts court held that injuries resulting
from three liquor bottles falling from an overhead bin consti-
tuted an accident.3 5 In Texas, a passenger's death from stroke
caused or exacerbated by a number of events, including the hot
temperature in the plane, rude treatment by airline employees,
and the flight crew's mishandling of the passenger's medical sit-
uation, potentially fell within the definition of an accident.36
There have been no cases, however, that have held that bump-
ing constituted an accident for purposes of Article 17. The
courts that have decided the issue of bumping under the Mon-
treal Convention or Warsaw Convention have instead consid-
ered it as an Article 19 delay or, alternatively, as contractual
nonperformance and, therefore, outside of the scope of the
Convention.3
B. CAMPBELL V. AIR JAMAICA
The Eleventh Circuit in Campbell likewise dismissed bumping
as an Article 17 accident.3 9 The court relied heavily on the Su-
preme Court's instruction that "'routine travel procedures' do
not amount to Article 17 accidents."4 The court broadly and
boldly declared that bumping is simply a routine travel proce-
32 Rafailov v. El A] Isr. Airlines, Ltd., No. 06 CV 13318 (GBD), 2008 WL
2047610 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008).
3 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
34 Wipranik v. Air Can., No. CV 06-3763 AHM (AJWx), 2007 WL 2441066 (C.D.
Cal. May 15, 2007).
35 Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd., 122 F. Supp. 2d 210, 212 (D. Mass. 2000).
36 McCaskey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
37 See Campbell v. Air jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1172-73 (11th Cir. 2014).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1172 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404-05 (1985)).
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dure. 4' The Campbell court supported its holding that bumping
is not an accident with a brief citation to cases that found bump-
ing instead to be either an Article 19 delay or contractual
nonperformance.42
The court did at least acknowledge the plaintiff's contention
that this was no ordinary bumping. 4 To Campbell's argument
that the airline did not follow proper bumping procedures by
issuing him a boarding pass, requiring him to pay a change fee,
and not updating their records to reflect the correct date of
travel, the court responded by claiming these "alleged irregulari-
ties are irrelevant."'44 The Eleventh Circuit looked to only those
precise events that were alleged to cause the injury, disregarding
the surrounding circumstances and subsequent chain of events
in determining whether an accident occurred. 4 ' This narrow
view contradicts the Supreme Court's instruction that all of the
circumstances surrounding the injury should be considered. 46
Furthermore, the Supreme Court "require [s] only that the pas-
senger be able to prove that some link in the chain was an unu-
sual or unexpected event. 47
III. ANALYSIS
By its broad generalization that bumping, as a matter of law, is
not an accident for purposes of Article 17, the court is heading
down a dangerous path that inappropriately limits the terms of
the Montreal Convention, unnecessarily forecloses on avenues
of recovery for international travelers, and promotes irresponsi-
ble and reckless behavior by the airline industry at large. Prima-
rily, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court directs that
the definition of accident should be "flexibly applied after as-
sessment of all the circumstances. '4 The test should not be
whether the one precise event that caused the injury is a com-
mon practice, but whether, taking the facts and circumstances
collectively, the common practice became an unexpected event
41 Id. ("[Bumping] is systematic, widely practiced, and widely known. There is
nothing accidental about it.... As a general matter, then, an Article 17 accident
does not occur merely because a passenger is bumped from a flight.").
42 Id. at 1172-73.
43 Id. at 1173.
-4Id.
45 Id.
46 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
47 Id. at 406.
- Id. at 405.
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somewhere along the chain of events." Refusing to allow pas-
sengers to change seats may be a common practice, but refusing
to allow an asthmatic gentleman to move away from the smok-
ing section is an accident. 50 Serving hot beverages onto seatback
trays is a routine travel procedure, but when a fellow passenger
moves in his seat and the tea tumbles into a woman's lap, an
accident has occurred.5" Rude flight attendants, hot airplane
cabins, and negligence by airline employees may be common
across the industry, but when the result is a man's death from
stroke, there is potential for liability as an accident.52 Finally, a
passenger being bumped from a flight may be a routine prac-
tice, but when a man, already ill from a four hour delay, is
bumped from a flight, kicked to the curb with no overnight shel-
ter, and forced to pay a change fee to secure a reservation on a
subsequent flight, an accident arguably has occurred. At the
very least, it poses a question of fact for the jury.
Even if the surrounding circumstances do not take the bump-
ing out of an ordinary industry practice and into an unexpected
or unusual happening, the Eleventh Circuit erred in affirming
the district court's dismissal. The Supreme Court instructed that
"where there is contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of fact
to decide whether an 'accident' as here defined caused the
plaintiffs injury. ' 5' The court's decision that bumping could
never qualify as an accident serves a further injustice to future
plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the court's misguided reliance on those deci-
sions that treat bumping as an Article 19 delay or as a state con-
tract claim will prevent plaintiffs from recovering for personal
injury damages rightfully afforded to them under the Montreal
Convention. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that Article 19
does not allow compensation for physical injury, thus Campbell
could not have recovered damages for his heart attack based on
49 See id. at 406.
50 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 657 (2004).
51 See Wipranik v. Air Can., No. CV 06-3763 AHM (AJWx), 2007 WL 2441066,
at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2007).
52 See McCaskey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 574 (S.D. Tex.
2001).
53 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405; see also McCaskey, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (concluding
that a failure to divert is not an ipsofacto accident, nor is it never an accident, but
instead a question of fact for the jury).
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delay.5 4 Furthermore, to prevail on a claim for contractual non-
performance, the airline would have to actually not peform.55 Be-
cause Campbell eventually reached his destination on an Air
Jamaica flight, it is unlikely he would be awarded damages based
on a contract claim. 6 Therefore, the only right of recovery for
international air travelers that suffer physical injury from an ac-
cident during or near flight is Article 17 of the Montreal Con-
vention, and the Supreme Court has approved a liberal
interpretation of the definition of "accident."57
Finally, the court compares bumping to routine weather or
maintenance delays, "unpleasant, but.., not unexpected or un-
usual.15 8 The court fails to take into account, however, that un-
like weather and maintenance delays that are often unavoidable
and necessary, bumping is a creature of the airline industry to
fill seats and hedge against losses from last minute cancellations.
Any business-minded American can appreciate a companym-or
even an entire industry-taking measures to boost profit and
protect its bottom line; however these practices must be done
safely and responsibly. Bumping from international flights is
particularly worrisome: in many instances flying transnationally,
compared to nationally, is more expensive, requires more plan-
ning and preparation by the passengers, and is more demand-
ing physically and mentally.59 If an airline insists on betting
against all reserved passengers arriving for their scheduled
flight, it should be prepared to pay the price when an accident
occurs by the bumping of certain individuals. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's broad approval of bumping as a common industry prac-
tice, thereby preventing plaintiffs from recovering damages for
any resulting injury, may promote reckless and unconscionable
54 Campbell v. AirJam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Article 19
permits the payment of economic damages but does not contemplate compensa-
tion for emotional loss or physical injury.").
55 Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(quoting Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1987)) ("The
court held that bumping was a case of non-performance of contract..., noting
that the appellants in the case were not 'attempting to recover for injuries caused
by their delay .... Rather their complaint [was] based on the fact that .. they
never left the airport."').
56 Id.
57 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405; McCaskey, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
58 Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1172-73.
59 Traveler's Checklist, U.S. DEPARTMENT STATE, BUREAU CONSULAR AFF., http://
travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/go/checklist.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2015).
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behavior on the part of the airlines and flies in the face of the
goals of the Montreal Convention.
In conclusion, with its decision in Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has critically limited the
definition of "accident" under Article 17 of the Montreal Con-
vention, precluded plaintiffs from their rightful recovery for
personal injury from accidents in flight, and opened the door-
or should I say cleared the runway-for airlines to detrimentally
mistreat their customers in an effort to increase revenue: all by
embracing "bumping" as a routine travel procedure. To borrow
the well-known sentiment from Judge Learned Hand, if it is
common industry practice to deny passengers their reserved seat
on a flight at the cost of the travelers' physical, financial, and
emotional well-being, it is time to change industry practice, and
the "courts must in the end say what is required; there are pre-
cautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will
not excuse their omission."'6
60 The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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